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NoTEs
RESTRICTION ON TESTATION IN KENTUCKY, COMMON-
LAW AND STATUTORY-WITH A SUGGESTED
PLAN OF LEGISLATION
I Introduction
The 1956 General Assembly altered substantially several key pro-
visions of the Kentucky Revised Statutes relating to the marital prop-
erty rights of a surviving spouse.' The effect of the specific amend-
ments will be discussed in detail later; for the present, suffice it to say
that, policywise, the overall effect of these amendments was to liberal-
ize the statutory share of the survivor. In making these changes the
Legislature focused attention broadly on Kentucky's statutory pro-
visions restricting testation. It is generally the purpose of this paper
to consider these statutes and the case law which has developed around
them with an eye to finding or developing some basic policy concept,
then to utilize this policy in the formation of a comprehensive scheme
of legislation. The value to be derived from having a strong guiding
principle like this is exemplified by the field of workmen's compensa-
tion. There the social nature of the legislation, as well as statutory
directive,2 indicate an intent that the law be construed to favor the
claimant. Thus, compensation cases that are technically hard can be
resolved by resort to this abiding policy. It is hoped that a similar
happy situation might obtain in this area of the law of succession.
A survey of the law of various countries and jurisdictions shows a
variety of concepts and policies. In the civil law countries, for in-
stance, testation is quite limited. The French reserve or legitime pro-
tects both ascendants and descendants, widows and children, 3 while
the German Pflichteil reserves rights in the testator's lands to descend-
ants, parents, and surviving spouses. 4 And both, in addition, restrict
inter vivos conveyances so as to favor children or parents. The English
law, on the other hand,5 developed by 1832 to the point where almost
complete freedom of testation was the rule.6 This policy was com-
pletely reversed, however, by the passage in 1938 of the Inheritance
(Family Provision) Act.7 That legislation made it possible for the
1 K . Rev. Stat. (hereinafter referred to as KRS) 892.010, 892.020, 892.090.
The biU was introduced by Mr. Edward T. Breathitt of Hopkinsville and was
considered as House Bill #7. These amendments became law on July 1, 1956.
2 KRS 842.004.
3 Simes, Public Policy and The Dead Hand (1955), at 6; Kocourek and Wig-
more, The Rational Basis of Legal Institutions (1928), at 462; Calm, Restraints
on Disinheritance, 85 U. Pa. L.R. 189, 140 (1936).
4 Simes, supra note 8.
G 85 U. Pa. L.R. 189, 140 (1986).0 Simes, supra note 8 at 10. An excellent summary of the developments in
English law may be found in 25 Cornell L.Q. 887 (1940).
7 1 & 2 George 6, 401. For analyses of the act, see 1 Modem L.R. 296, 25
Cornell L.Q. 887 (1940).
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courts, upon proper application, to "rewrite" the will of a testator who
failed to make "reasonable provision" for spouse or dependent children.
Only by leaving two-thirds of his or her estate to the surviving spouse
can the testator defeat the courts' jurisdiction-a far cry, indeed, from
the old policy of complete freedom.
II Present Restrictive Statutes and Their Application
Operating generally between the two extremes of the English law,
American jurisdictions, while retaining dower, have adopted a variety
of means for restricting testamentary freedom. Prominent among
these are homestead exemptions, family allowances, community prop-
erty laws, provisions for pretermitted children, and the elective share.
Simes finds that dower exists today "in over a score of states," that
community property laws are in effect in eight states, that two states
restrict testation primarily through generous homestead statutes, and
that the right to elect against a spouse's will exists, in varying forms,
in thirty-eight states.8 Pretermitted child statutes are, if anything,
more prevalent than most of these.9
Homestead
Kentucky, in one form or another, has adopted all but one (com-
munity property) of these basic testamentary restrictions. Probably
the least effective of the lot, by virtue of the obsolescence of its valua-
tion provisions, is the homestead statute. Basically, this statute is de-
signed to protect (if a one thousand dollar maximum can be said to
protect) the family home from the depredations of creditors.10 How-
ever, Kentucky extends this protection to the surviving husband or
wife and/or infant children." This has created no little difficulty,
as an investigation of the problem from the viewpoint of the pro-
spective testator will show. In the first place, the interest is deriva-
tive.12 It will not arise in favor of the widow or children unless the
deceased has previously qualified as a "bona fide housekeeper with a
family resident in this state."13 And even though he has thus qualified,
8 Sines, supra note 8 at 19.
9 57 Am. Jur. 891.
10 KRS 427.060.
11 KRS 427.070, 427.100. And the protection has been broadened to exclude
claims of the heirs as well as creditors during the occupancy of the surviving
spouse and/or infant children. Lancaster v. Redding, 16 Ky. L. Rep. 147, 26 S.W.
1013 (1894); Gasaway v. Woods, 72 Ky. 72 (9 Bush 1872).
'
2 Higgins v. Higgins, 117 Ky. 725, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1824, 78 S.W. 1124
(1904); Runyon v. Runyon's Adm'x., 264 Ky. 828, 95 S.W. 2d 802 (1936). The
court, by virtue of a bit of judicial legislation, appears to have made an exception
to this requirement in the case of homesteads worth less than a thousand dollars.
Howard v. Mitchell, 268 Ky. 429, 105 S.W. 2d 128 (1936).
13 KRS 427.060.
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the interest is defeated if he sells the property 4 or mortgages it.'5 In
addition, a purchase money mortgage or debt "existing prior to the
purchase of the land or the erection of the improvements thereon"
will always have priority over the homestead right.16
But our primary concern here is the effect of this statutory pro-
vision on the prospective testator. What of his right to dispose of the
old home place? Apparently, judging by the dearth of decisions, his
right to devise it to one outside of the immediate family has never
been seriously contested in Kentucky. However, with the law in its
present state, this should provide no problem, since the widow must
elect among homestead, dower, and the Vill.17 And with real estate
values what they are, dower (or the statutory share) would in the
great majority of cases undoubtedly prove more valuable than the
homestead right. This, coupled with the fact that the homestead is a
mere right of occupancy,' 8 while dower is an estate in land,19 together
with the fact that homestead must be shared with any infant children,
while dower is the widow's right alone, make it extremely unlikely
that homestead would ever be elected over both the will and the
dower right.20 For this reason, it seems, the prospective testator need
pay very little attention to the homestead interest in making his will.
Only when the total value of the dower right (which will undoubtedly
be elected where the homestead property is devised to a third party)
or of the homestead itself (if the testator devises it to the widow
14 Hanna's Assignees v. Gay, 117 Ky. 695, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1794, 78 S.W. 915
(1904); Pugh v. Pugh, 279 Ky. 170, 130 S.W. 2d 40 (1939).
15 KRS 427.060.
16 KRS 427.060.
17 That an election is necessary between homestead and a will, see Hazelett
v. Farthing, 94 Ky. 421, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 197, 22 S.W. 646 (1893) (surviving
wife); Schnabel v. Schnabel's Ex'x., 108 Ky. 536, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 234, 56 S.W.
983 (1900), and Jarboe v. Hayden, 133 Ky. 378, 117 S.W. 961 (1909) (sur-
viving husband).
18 Lear v. Lear, 234 Ky. 869, 28 S.W. 2d 32 (1930); Ferguson v. Board of
Drainage Comrs. of Graves County for Mayfield Creek Drainage Dist. No. 2, 299
Ky. 538, 186 S.W. 2d 16 (1945).
19 KRS 392.020.20 Before we judge too hastily the widow who cuts out her infant children
by choosing dower or the will, let me point out that there is good authority for the
proposition that the children retain their homestead, either in property taken
under the will, Schnabel v. Schnabels Exx, 108 Ky. 536, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 234, 56
S.W. 983 (1900), Kieswetter v. Kress, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 1239, 70 S.W. 1065 (1902),
or in the elected dower share. In Re Gibson, 33 Fed. Supp. 838 (1940). How-
ever, equally strong authority to the contrary exists. Hazelett v. Farthing, 94 Ky.
421, 15 Ky. L. Rep. 197, 22 S.W. 646 (1893); Jarboe v. Hayden, 133 Ky. 378,
117 S.W. 961 (1909). Russell and Merritt, in their Kentucky Practice, Probate
Practice and Procedure (1955), offer two separate rationalizations for these con-
flicting cases, in one section (238) suggesting that the existence or nonexistence
of creditors determines the infant's rights and later (section 245) stating that the
determining factor is whether the widow comes into her interest by operation of
law or by will.
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and/or children) is less than one thousand dollars, either for the
reason that the property is of little value or that the testator is deep
in debt, will the homestead provision be chosen to defeat his in-
tention as expressed by his will. In those cases alone will claiming the
homestead pay off.21
Generally, however, a testator may avail himself of devices much
more likely to carry out his purposes. If he desires that the widow
take only after his creditors have been satisfied, he may will the
property to her. Unless she renounces the will, her rights will be sub-
ject to those of the creditors.22 If, on the other hand, he seeks to estab-
lish in her a right paramount to creditors, he may create a joint
tenancy in the property with right of survivorship. 23 If he intends to
cut off the widow and/or children from their homestead rights alto-
gether, he need merely, as we have seen, sell the property.24 But in
the great majority of cases the mere existence of the dower statute
is sufficient assurance that the widow will not exercise her homestead
right.
Quarantine
Closely related to the homestead right is the widow's right of
quarantine, secured to her by KRS 392.050. This statute merely makes
interim provision for the widow, allowing her to occupy the mansion
house and grounds and receive the rents and profits from dowable
realty, pending assignment of her dower. It constitutes a very limited
sort of restriction on the testator; the property so occupied eventually
passes by the will.
Pretermitted Children
On the other hand, two statutory provisions clearly constitute
restrictions on the freedom to dispose of property by will. The first,
K.R.S. 394.380, concerns the pretermitted child in two situations. First,
where the will is made before the testator has children, the afterborn
child can have the court conditionally set aside the will, the condition
being that if he dies under twenty-one, unmarried, and without issue,
the will takes effect as intended.25 In the second situation, the testator
has children at the time of making the will; 26 the afterborn child in
this case takes an intestate share, to be furnished by the legatees and
21 Note that any revision upward in the homestead allowance-and one is
sorely needed-could alter substantially the effect of this statute as outlined here.
22 Schnabel v. Scbnabel's Ex'x, 108 Ky. 536, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 284, 56 S.W.
983 (1900).
23 14 Am. Jur. 80.
24 Supra note 14.
25 KRS 394.880(1).
26 By a recent case, Scott v. Scott, 291, S.W. 2d 551 (Ky. 1956), this in-
cludes a child as yet unborn who is provided for in the will.
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devisees ratably, subject, however, to reimbursement if the child dies,
unmarried and without issue, before reaching twenty-one.27
This statute has several significant aspects. In the first place, the
testator can prevent operation of either section of the statute in favor
of the afterborn child by providing for him in the will, expressly
excluding him from the will, or by a settlement.28 In at least one case,
Leonard v. EnochS,29 intent to expressly exclude was inferred from
the fact that all children of the testator living at the time of the will's
execution were also excluded. It has been argued that the same re-
sult should follow where the wife is pregnant at the time the will is
executed, since failure to provide in such a case also indicates an in-
tent to disinherit.30 If this logic were consistently followed, the effect
of sub-section (2) of the statute would be altered markedly. Instead
of providing for all afterborn children not expressly included or
omitted, it would provide only for those whose brothers and/or sisters
took under the will. This appears to be a very reasonable limitation,
since it seems quite logical to assume that the testator would not
intend to provide for afterborn children if the children living at the
time of execution of the will were not similarly taken care of. Despite
this sort of judicial legislation, the fact remains that the child living
at the time of execution who takes nothing by the will is not provided
for at all by the statute.8 ' This means that his sole interest in his
parent's estate is a tenuous, insubstantial homestead right. When
compared with the child's lot in the civil law countries or under Eng-
land's Inheritance Act,32 this seems a niggardly portion indeed.
A third aspect of this statute which warrants comment stems from
the old common law rule that birth of issue to one childless at the time
of execution of his will so changed his circumstances as to revoke the
will. Subsection (1) of this statute apparently was intended to codify
this rule, the result of which is that the testator's entire will could be
nullified by his failure to "mention" afterborn children in a will made
when he was childless.33 This is not true under subsection (2), where
27JKRS 894.380(2).
28 KRS 394.380; and see, Logan v. Bean's Adm'r., 120 Ky. 712, 87 S.W. 1110
(1905) (expressed intent to exclude); Porter v. Porter's Ex'r., 120 Ky. 302, 86
S.W. 546 (1905) (settlement).
20 92 Ky. 186, 17 S.W. 437 (1891).
80 42 Ky. L.J. 35.
31 In twenty-six states, he is provided for. Russell and Merritt, Kentucky
Practice, Probate Practice and Procedure, 255.32 Supra note 7.
33 Knut v. Knut, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 972, 58 S.W. 583 (1900) where the court,
at p. 584 said ". . the statute declares the construction to fe given the will,
i.e., the aevises and bequests are limited to take effect in the event appellant
shall die under the age of 21 years, unmarried and without issue." Although this
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the words indicate an intent that the will should stand.34 But the
careful draftsman should guard against operation of the statute in any
manner by always making provision for the afterborn child. What,
though, is to be done with the homemade will? The intent of the lay
testator can easily be completely frustrated by a failure to mention the
afterborn child. Not only this, but the legatees, devisees, and the
child himself, must wait twenty-one years to be sure of their rights.
Surely this subsection could profitably be revised along the pattern
of subsection (2) so that rights of the legatees or devisees would be
disturbed only so far as is necessary to make up the afterborn child's
portion.
The second statute involving children of the testator is KRS
394.390. This provides that the child or grandchild of a testator takes
an intestate share "as provided in favor of a pretermitted child,"3 5 if
he is either:
(1) a child or grandchild of the testator
(a) who was living at the testator's death,
(b) whom the testator believed to be dead, both at the time
he made the will and at his death, and
(c) who is neither expressly excluded or provided for by the
will, or
(2) a grandchild of the testator
(a) who was living at the testator's death,
(b) whose parent (child of the testator) died outside of
Kentucky, which fact is known to the testator,
(c) whose existence is unknown to the testator, and
(d) who is neither expressly excluded or provided for in the
will.
is actually no more than a direct quote from the statute, it indicates no inclination
to vary from the plain meaning of the words. And, so far as the writer can
determine, no subsequent Kentucky case has done so either. In addition, both
Virginia and West Virginia have construed identical statutes as revoking the will
entirely. Wood v. Tredway, 111 Va. 526, 69 S.E. 445 (1910) (will declared
"void when he [child] arrives at the age of 21 or marries."). Cunningham v.
Dunn, 84 W. Va. 593, 100 S.E. 410 (1919) (following Tredway and containing
an excellent discussion of the entire problem).
34 Mann v. Peoples-Liberty Bank and Trust Co., 265 S.W. 2d 489 (Ky. 1953);3 5 What the statute means by, "as provided in favor of a pretermitted child,
is not clear. In Farber's Exr. v. Farber, 282 Ky. 373, 138 S.W. 2d 986 (1940),
the court says, "It is obvious from the reading of section 4842 [KRS 394.390] that
the contesting of a will is not a prerequisite to making claim under that statute.
In fact, the will stands, but the one making the claim, if substantiated, takes as
if the testator had left no will." On a subsequent appeal of the same case, 285 Ky.
597, 148 S.W. 2d 732 (1949), the court held that the entire estate went over to
the child from the party holding under the will-quite an about-face.
[Vol. 46,
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The last sentence of this section makes it possible for the presumption
upon which this section is based-that the child was omitted by mis-
take-to be rebutted, thus preventing operation of the statute. On the
whole, there has been very little litigation under this statute, and
except for the problem surrounding the words, "as provided in favor
of a pretermitted child," which has been noted,36 there seems little to
add.
Personal Property Exemption
As the homestead statute limits the testator by reserving rights to
his family in his realty, so the personal property exemption statute
limits him by protecting rights of the family in his personalty.37 KRS
391.030 says:
(1) Where any person dies intestate as to his personal estate . . .
(c) Personal property or money on hand or in bank to the
amount of $1500 shall be exempt from distribution and sale and
shall be set apart by appraisers of the estate of an intestate to
his widow and infant children, or if there is no widow to his
infant children surviving him. ....
Subsection (3) of the same statute extends this right to the case
where the deceased dies testate and the widow elects against the will
under KRS 392.080. In either case the money or property is "set
apart" and never becomes a part of the estate. It therefore takes
precedence over claims of heirs,38 debts of the deceased,3 9 and funeral
expenses,40 but not over prior liens such as mortgages or labor liens.41
Although the statute plainly seems to limit the right to the widow and
infant children, or the infant children alone, it has nevertheless been
held to apply in favor of a widow without children.42 It therefore must
36 Ibid.
3 7 An exception has been made where the widow uses the money or per-
sonalty on hand to pay the debts of the deceased, leaving less than her exemption
in the till. In such a case, the court has allowed a sale of realty to repay the
widow. Nesbit v. Wood, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 127, 56 S.W. 714 (1900); Kilburn v. Holi-
day, 295 Ky. 843, 175 S.W. 2d 516 (1943). And the same is true where the
property has been misappropriated by others. Meyers' Adm'r. v. Meyers, 244 Ky.
248, 50 S.W. 2d 81 (1932).3 8 Commonwealth v. Bracken, 17 Ky. L. Rep. 785, 32 S.W. 609 (1895).39 Thompson v. Thompson, 117 Ky. 526, 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1626, 78 S.W. 418
(1904).40 Blades v. Blades' Adm'r., 289 Ky. 556, 159 S.W. 2d 407 (1942); Kilburn
v. Holliday, 295 Ky. 843, 175 S.W. 2d 516 (1943).41 International Harvester Co. v. Dyer's Adm'r., 297 Ky. 55, 178 S.W. 2d 966
(1944).42 Meyers' Adm'r. v. Meyers, 244 Ky. 248, 50 S.W. 2d 81 (1982). Russell
and Merritt, see. 212, points out that the present statute was changed in 1912 from
a widow or infant children to the present reading, which would indicate even more
strongly that the legislative intent was to cut out the widow without children.
Decisions since the change, which like the Meyers case above, pay no attention
to this wording indicate that the argument may never have been advanced.
KENTucKY LAw JouRNAL
be reckoned with in all cases involving a married testator,43 especially
in view of the fact that, unlike homestead, the widow's exemption is
cumulative, that is, in addition to the dower right under KRS 392.020.44
The right, however, can be barred; a judicial summary of the ways in
which this is accomplished appears in Eversole v. Eversoe,45 where
the court said: 46
In this state the property rights of a widow in the estate of her
deceased husband are controlled entirely by statute. She is entitled
to an absolute estate in one-half of his surplus personalty, and to an
estate for her life in one-third of his real estate [KRS 892.020], unless
the right thereto has been barred, forfeited, or relinquished. She and the
infant children of the decendent are also entitled to have set apart
to them, as exempt from distribution and sale, personal property or
money of the value of $750 [changed in 1946 to the present $1500].
A wife may forfeit her interest in her husband's estate by
adultery or bigamy. Kentucky Statutes, sections 2188 and 1217.
[KRS 892.090 (2) and 392.100] Her interest may be barred by
jointure or by divorce. Kentucky Statutes, sections 2186 and 2144.
[KRS 892.120 and 892.090 (1)] She may also relinquish her dower
right by deed or mortgage. Kentucky Statutes, section 2135 [KRS
892.040]. ...
The court went on to hold in the Eversole case that since no statute
barred the widow's rights in the event that she killed her husband,
the court was foreclosed from preventing her assertion of those rights.
The same line of reasoning was followed in Meyers" Adnr. v. Meyers,47
but has since been negated by the passage, in 1940, of KRS 881.280,
which expressly prevents the widow from receiving her share of the
estate if she killed her husband.
Dower and Curtesy
Two statutes, which, taken together, undoubtedly constitute the
greatest restriction on Kentucky testators are KRS 392.020, the modern
equivalent of dower and curtesy, and KRS 392.080, which extends to
the surviving spouse of a testator the right to renounce the will and
take the statutory share allotted under 392.020. As noted at the be-
ginning of this note, the 1956 legislature amended both of these
statutes. The changes made were as follows:
(1) 392.020-Surviving spouse's interest was changed from a one-
third life estate in all real property of which "the other spouse
4 3 Not, however, in those cases involving a testatrixi This right does not
run to the husband. Hamilton's Adm'x. v. Riney, 140 Ky. 476, 131 S.W. 287
(1910).4 4 1Miller v. Keown, 176 Ky. 117, 195 S.W. 480 (1917).
45 169 Ky. 793, 185 S.W. 487 (1916).
46 Id. at 794-95.
47 Supra note 42.
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NOTES
*.. was seized of an estate in fee simple during coverture.
. . ." to,
(a) an estate in fee
(1) in one-half
(2) of the surplus real estate
(3) of which the spouse was seized at death, plus
(b) an estate for life
(1) in one-third
(2) of any real estate
(3) of which spouse was seized during coverture but not
at death.
(2) 892.080-Wording was clarified substantially, and
(a) the right to renounce a spouse's will was extended to the
husband;48
(b) but no change was made in the interest given to the
renouncing spouse (despite the liberalization made in
favor of the spouse of an intestate), it remaining a one-
third life estate in any realty and an absolute estate in one-
half of the surplus personalty.49
It is immediately apparent that the major changes are in favor of the
surviving spouse of an intestate under section 392.020. The provisions
which constitute limitations on testation were, with one exception,
left unchanged. The lone exception is the inclusion of the surviving
husbands right to renounce his spouse's will. And this, instead
of proving to be a greater restriction on the testatrix, may very well
prove to be a relaxation-for this reason: At common law it was pre-
sumed that any provision for one's spouse in a will was intended to
be in addition to his or her rights of dower or curtesy. In Kentucky,
this presumption was reversed by 392.080, and an election was neces-
sary unless a contrary intent was expressed in the will or "necessarily
inferable" from it. However, the husband had no rights under 392.080,
only the widow; therefore, the court construed another section, KRS
894.820, as giving a surviving husband the right to disclaim his spouse's
will.50 Since the husband's rights were not dependent upon 392.080,
48 To make this complete, KRS 392.010 was also amended, excluding 892.080
as an exception to its direction that a husband's interest in his wife's estate be the
same as her interest in his estate.
49 Mr. Edward T. Breathitt, who introduced the amendments, explained, in
a letter to the writer, that the reason for not changing this section was the fear
that it would require a wholesale review and revision of existing wills.
5o Brand's Exec. v. Brand, 109 Ky. 721, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1866, 60 S.W. 704
(1901); Bottom v. Fultz, 124 Ky. 802, 80 Ky. L. Rep. 479, 98 S.W. 1037 (1907).
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the common-law presumption that they were in addition to provisions
for him in his spouse's will continued. As a result, it was held that
the husband of a partially testate spouse might take both his curtesy
rights under the statute and the property given him by the will.,
Obviously, such a ruling was a greater restriction on the testatrix
than was the statutory rule on the testator, which forced the widow
to an election. Therefore, the legislature, by including the surviving
husband in KRS 892.080, has indicated an intent that the surviving
husband's rights in his spouse's estate be curtailed. The net effect of
this is to give to a testatrix greater freedom in the disposition of her
estate than she formerly had.
If we say, then, that the amendments impose no new burden on
testation, it remains for us to determine what limitations these statutes
do place on the testator. It should be obvious. Since the surviving
spouse is given the right to renounce the will and take, in its stead, his
or her statutory share, it is reasonable to assume that in order to
minimize the chances of renunciation the prospective testator must
will the surviving spouse property that is roughly equivalent to the
value of the statutory share 52 plus (in the case of a widow) the $1500
exemption.53
In assaying the relative value of the will provision and the statu-
tory share, two points are important. First, a careful classification of
the testators property as real or personal must be made. The statutory
share in realty, though only a one-third life estate, is taken from all
real property owned54 by the testator during coverture and is not sub-
ject to the claims of creditors. The interest in personalty, on the other
hand, is an absolute estate in one-half but applies only to property
owned at death, and only to such of that as is "surplus." This classifica-
tion, therefore, could conceivably make a substantial difference in the
amount due the widow. Apparently however, despite the numerous
51 Voss v. Stortz, 177 Ky. 541, 197 S.W. 964 (1917).
52 This is obviously only a generalization, and this problem would have to
be considered in each case in relation to the personalities involved, the particular
proge rty concerned, and al the thousand-and-one other factors which could
ea.ycause balance sheet comparisons to be secondary. It should also be noted
that the will provision needn t equate the personal property given with the
statutory personalty or the realty with the realty, merely the overall value, since
the will must be rejected in its entirety. Morguelan v. Morguelan's Ex'r., 307 Ky.
94, 209 S.W. 2d 824 (1948).
53 The value of this might not be actually $1500, if a forced division with
infant children were likely. For a discussion of the cases involving division see,
Russell and Merritt, Probate Practice and Procedure, 159-161 (1955).54
"Seized," as used in 392.020, has been construed by the Kentucky Court
to mean "owned." Chalk v. Chalk, 291 Ky. 702, 165 S.W. 2d 534 (1942); Pursi-
full's Adm'x. v. Pursifull, 299 Ky. 245, 184 S.W. 2d 967 (1945).
[Vol. 46,
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borderline problems which might arise.55 it has caused no serious prob-
lem in Kentucky, except, perhaps, in the case of oil or gas leases.56
Having classified the property as real or personal, it remains to
decide whether that property is subject to allocation as part of the
statutory share. In most cases this will cause no great problem. How-
ever, in some of the borderline cases and even in some where the
interest is concededly real in nature,57 this question must be settled.
The solution has been said by the court to depend on any one of
several things. In some cases the decision has turned on the statutory
requirement of fee simple ownership,58 in others on a perpetuation of
the common-law concept of seisin,59 and in still others upon a de-
termination of whether the deceased spouse did or did not have the
beneficial ownership.60 Finally, some of the problems have been set-
tled by statute.61 Each of these factors should be considered by the
draftsman in any attempt to determine the value of the statutory in-
terest. An analysis of what is or should be the determinative factor
in each case is beyond the scope of this article, but has been dealt
with in detail both in a note in the Kentucky Law Journa6 2 and in
Russell and Merritt's Probate Practice and Procedure.63
Jointure and Agreements
The problems involved in considering the statutory share and the
widow's exemption may be avoided by agreement-either antenuptial"4
or postnuptial65-or by a conveyance or devise "by way of Jointure."6"
Both types of agreements, as might be expected, are subject to attack
55 See 16 Am. Jur. 793-794.
56 Russell and Merritt, 1 Probate Practice and Procedure 80 (1955).
57 Van Camp v. Evans, 306 Ky. 59, 206 S.W. 2d 38 (1947).58 Bodkin v. Wright, 266 Ky. 798, 100 S.W. 2d 824 (1937) )(no dower in a
life estate); Van Camp v. Evans, 306 Ky. 59, 206 S.W. 2d 38 (1947) (no dower
in an oil and gas lease where lessee was obligated to develop the property);
Trimble v. Kentucky River Coal Corporation, 235 Ky. 301, 31 S.W. 2d 367(1930).
59 Landers v. Landers, 151 Ky. 206, 151 S.W. 386 (1912) (Dower allowed,
however, in a defeasible fee, even though the fee expires upon death without
issue, since this is an "inheritable estate. ); Goodrun's Guardian v. Kelsey, 244
Ky. 349, 50 S.W. 2d 932 (1932) (no dower in a remainder, since the deceased
spouse did not have "possession").
0039 Ky. L.J. 120 (1950) and specifically, the instances noted at pages 123
(land subject to equities and liens) and 127 (land held in trust and land under
contract of sale).61 KRS 392.040.
62 39 Ky. L.J. 120 (1950).63 Vol. 1, Secs. 105-117 (1955).64 Stephens v. Stephens, 181 Ky. 480, 205 S.W. 573 (1918); 33 Ky. L.J.
197 (1945,.
05 Coleman v. Coleman, 142 Ky. 36, 133 S.W. 1003 (1911).
00 KRS 392.120.
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on the basis of fraud.67 The antenuptial agreement, being in considera-
tion of marriage generally, must comply with the statute of frauds, 0
but an agreement between husband and wife need not unless there
is some other reason, such as the involvement of real estate. 9 Except
for these problems, the agreement is a very effective instrument by
which to bar the surviving spouse's statutory claim.
Jointure, preserved by statute in Kentucky,70 is not actually a
separate and distinct means by which to extinguish a spouse's statutory
rights, despite its possible common-law interpretation. Today, it is a
generic term, including the two types of agreements discussed above
as well as any devise or conveyance made with the intent that it be in
lieu of the statutory share. It is important to remember, however, that
jointure, like the statutory share, may be permanently barred by
divorce (KRS 392.090(1) ), adultery (KRS 392.090(2) ), bigamy (KRS
392.100), or voluntary release by deed (KRS 392.040).
It should be clear from this rather abbreviated discussion of the
statutes that Kentucky has no clear statutory policy in this area. The
statutory provisions are piecemeal and, as a result, complicated by a
wealth of case law. They manifest neither a clear policy to restrict
testation nor to provide uniformly for the natural objects of the
testator's bounty. Therefore, instead of the sort of revision made by
the 1956 legislature, these sections require wholesale repeal and re-
placement. To give this statement added emphasis one need only
look to the problems raised by the failure of the statutes to prevent
evasion by inter vivos conveyance.
III Evasion of the Statutes by Inter Vivos Conveyance
The statutes discussed thus far enunciate certain rules. They
declare generally that certain of the natural objects of a person's
bounty may not be effectively ignored by him in his will. Failure of a
testator to abide by these rules makes it possible for the specified
statutory objects to have his will set aside, in whole or in part, in order
that provision be made for them. Not everyone, however, loves the
natural objects of his bounty. As a result, it is almost inevitable that
attempts will be made to circumvent the statutory directives. In this
particular area the obvious method is to make an inter vivos gift,71
6TColeman v. Coleman, 142 Ky. 36, 183 S.W. 1003 (1911) (post-nuptial);
Harlin v. Harlin, 261 Ky. 414, 87 S.W. 2d 937 (1935) (ante-nuptial).68 KRS 371.010(5).
69 KRS 371.010(6).T0 KRS 392.120.71 Where the property is transferred for a valuable consideration there is no
problem. Not only would it impose an intolerable burden on the free transfer-
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since if the deceased has no property at death, there is no need to
evolve a testamentary scheme complying with the statutory require-
ments. To prevent this, courts generally have been forced to a certain
amount of judicial legislation in order to carry out the intent of the
legislature and insure that the statutory objects are provided for.
In Kentucky the statutes provide, in various ways, for the surviving
spouse, children and grandchildren-no one else. At least two of the
statutes, one providing for pretermitted children and one providing
for unknown grandchildren, expressly declare that their provisions
may be foreclosed from operation by the testator; he need merely
state an intent that the issues be excluded from sharing in his estate.72
Similarly, the homestead statute does not preclude, and has therefore
been construed as allowing, the sale of the homestead property 3 by
the head of the family. Under the homestead exemption statute, the
question of evasion by inter vivos gift has not arisen, probably because
any gift which would defeat this right of the wife would also defeat
her statutory right under KRS 892.020. This latter being the more
substantial interest, it would undoubtedly be asserted instead. The
net result of all this is that we are concerned almost solely with the
dower or curtesy right in cases of evasion. That statute alone, in Ken-
tucky, creates a substantial right in a natural object of the testators
bounty, unlimited by any reservation to the testator of a right to defeat
it. And this is true in most states. As a result, the problem of evasion
by inter vivos gift is generally concerned with only the husband and
wife and their statutory share.
The General Common-Law Rule
Before proceeding further, one proposition should be made clear.
Although our discussion to this point might tend to indicate a general
rule that marriage limits the power of a man to gratuitously dispose
of his property during his lifetime because of the statutory restraints
on testation, actually, the converse is true. As stated in a recent ALR
annotation :4
The fundamental rule is that a husband may make an ab-
solute gift or other voluntary disposition of his property during his
lifetime, without violating any marital rights of his wife.
ability of goods and property to allow a spouse to attack paid-for transfers, but
it would fly in the face of the general rules protecting a bona fide purchaser.
Where the transferee has notice of or is party to the fraud, of course, payment of
valuable consideration will not be a defense to the action of the surviving spouse.
See, generally, 26 Am. Jur. 813.
72 KRS 394.380, 894.390.
7 Supra note 14 and 15.
74 49 A.L.R. 2d 521, at 528 (1956).
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The writer then goes on to list three exceptions to the general rule:
(1) cases where the statute itself gives the spouse an estate or interest
in the property during the owning spouse's lifetime (for example, the
Kentucky statute which creates an inchoate right in real property of
either spouse), (2) instances where the courts have said the transfer
made was merely "colorable" or "illusory" and (3) situations wherein
the court has deemed the transfer to be a "fraud" on the marital rights
of the surviving spouse. Any elaboration on the first type, the statutory
exceptions, would be beyond the purview of our discussion here. We
are concerned instead with the latter two judicial concepts and their
operation outside of the letter of the statute.
A prime example of adherence to the basic concept, as stated above,
is found in the Pennsylvania cases. Though prevented from applying
the general rule across the board by a statute which reserves to the
wife an interest in all realty owned during coverture,75 the Pennsyl-
vania courts have consistently allowed the husband to dispose of
personalty by inter vivos conveyance, even though his intent was to
"hinder his wife from sharing in his estate."76 As one court put it:71
It is the settled law of this state that a man may do what he pleases
with his personal estate during his life. He may even beggar himself
and his family, if he chooses to commit such an act of folly. When
he dies, and then only, do the rights of his wife attach to his personal
estate.
The Pennsylvania courts have ostensibly placed a limitation on this
sweeping disregard of the spouse's martial rights, by holding that a
showing of actual fraud will defeat the husband's inter vivos con-
veyance.78 This, of course, offers the wife no unique protection, be-
cause such an action is available to the least of the claimants against
her husband's estate. Not only that, but it becomes available to her
only in the most serious cases, as where there is collusion between the
husband and the transferee,79 or where there is an intent to defraud
75 Purdon's Pa. Stat., Tit. 20, see. 15 (1950).
76 Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144 A. 401 (1928).
7 7 Lines v. Lines, 142 Pa. 149, 165 21 A. 809 (1891).
78 Ibid.
79 See the language in Potter Title and Trust Co. v. Braum, 294 Pa. 482, 144
A. 401, 402 (1928), where the court said,
• ..the husband may dispose of such property by voluntary gift
inter vivos, without his wife's consent, and free from any claim on her
part, provided collusion to defraud the wife is not established; if such
intention does apear, the gift will be set aside; . .
Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721, 723 (1932),
where the court said:
"In the cases first above, cited ... the question of the hus-
band's or wife's intent to commit an actual fraud . . .was not con-
sidered. ... In the later authorities. . . however, it is treated as the
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an erstwhile spouse of her alimony,8 0 or where the transfer is a mere
sham or pretense, not actually passing the property rights.8' It does
not, on the other hand, prevent the husband from establishing a trust
and retaining the right to receive income, to revoke, to amend, or (at
least by the statement of one dissenting judge) to control and manage
the property in the hands of the trustee.8 2 In short, it makes virtually
no inroad on the general proposition that a spouse is free to make an
inter vivos conveyance of any property in which the other spouse has
no present interest.
The "Illusory Transfer" Exception
As noted at the outset, other jurisdictions have been more liberal
than Pennsylvania in making exceptions to the general rule. These
exceptions have developed along two general lines, one group of states,
Kentucky included, placing emphasis on the transferors intent, the
other school looking only to whether the transfer is real or "illusory."
At first blush this latter view seems only to be the Pennsylvania doc-
trine revisited, and, as a matter of fact, the leading case on the subject,
Newman v. Dore,83 cited several of the Pennsylvania decisions, even
quoting from one as follows:84
The 'good faith' required of the donor or settlor ... does
not refer to the purpose to affect his wife but to the intent to divest
himself of the ownership of the property.
However, after determining that retention by the settlor of the income
for life, the right to revoke, and the right to control the trustees
management of the fund rendered the transfer in question illusory,
the Court went on to say:8 5
We do not attempt now to formulate any general test
of how far a settlor must divest himself of his interest in the trust
property to render the conveyance more than illusory. Question of
whether reservation of the income or of a power of revocation, or
vital factor, and if actual fraud upon the other spouse is shown to have
been the real cause of the transfer ... the conveyance is held void."
(All emphasis added)
But cf. cases cited in the dissenting opinion at 725.
S0 Armstrong v. Connelly, 299 Pa. 51, 149 A. 87 (1930).
81 See the Potter case, supra note 79, in which the court, at page 402, said,
"... the 'good faith' required of the donor in making a valid disposition of his
property during his lifetime does not refer to the purpose to affect his wife, but to
the intent to divest himself of the ownership of the property." Virtually the same
language was used in Benkart v. Commonwealth Trust Co. of Pittsburgh, 269 Pa.
257, 259, 112 A. 62, 63 (1920) and earlier cases cited there.82 Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 307 Pa. 570, 161 A. 721 (1932).
83 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966, 112 A.L.R. 643 (1937).
84 9 N.E. 2d at 969, quoting from Benkart v. Commonwealth, supra note 81.
85 Ibid.
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both, might even without reservation of the power of control be suf-
ficient to show that the transfer was not intended in good faith to
divest the settlor of his property must await decision until such
question arises.
It seems clear that the court was of the opinion that it was possible
to constitute a trust, which though valid in itself (although this one
probably was not), would still be "illusory" as to the surviving spouse.
Such an opinion is well removed from the Pennsylvania notion that the
widow may set aside only transfers that in fact passed no property
right.
Unfortunately, however, this idea received only passing acceptance
in subsequent New York casess6 before being almost completely re-
pudiated in the case of In Re Halpern's Estate,87 where the court
sustained a Totten Trust against the surviving widow's attack, fully
aware, I have no doubt, that such a trust represents the maximum in
retention of control and benefit by the donor. The Halpern position
is apparently the unquestioned rule in New York today;88 and the
Newman view of the illusory test now finds its chief exponent in the
Supreme Court of Ohio. That court, in Bolles v. Toledo Trust Co.,""
citing the Newman case, held that a trust instrument which reserved
to the settlor the income for life and the right to amend or revoke,
although a valid trust in itself, was invalid to the extent that it de-
prived the surviving wife of her statutory rights. This proposition has
been followed in the only subsequent Ohio case on the point,90 al-
though it should be noted that the decision was 4-3 and accompanied
by vigorous dissenting opinions. As a result, the illusory test, insofar
as it attempts to provide the surviving spouse with a mode of attack
unavailable to other claimants against the estate, appears to hang by a
slim thread, even in the state where it is most strongly entrenched.
Notwithstanding this, however, it is clear that the concept of Newman
v. Dore remains as a possible weapon with which to curtail a spouse's
86Fo example, Krause v. Krause, 285 N.Y. 27 32 N.E. 2d 779 (1941);
Steixner v. Bowery Savings Bank, 86 N.Y.S. 2d 747 (S. Ct. 1949).
87 303 N.Y. 83, 100 N.E. 2d 120 (1951).8S In re Freistadts Will, 279 App. Div. 603, 107 N.Y.S. 2d 466 (2d Dept.
1951); In re Friesing's Estate, 123 N.Y.S. 2d 207, 210 (1953), where the courtsaid,
"The Court of Appeals has now weakened that concept [the Newman
v. Dore view that a trust might be valid generally but invalid as to
the surviving spouse] by its statement that if the creation of a savings
bank account in trust for a designated beneficiary constitutes an
illusory transfer, it is wholly bad, and not partially bad, so that the
fund becomes an estate asset for all purposes, and not for the limited
purpose of satisfying the surviving spouse's expectant interests there-
n.
89 144 Ohio St. 195, 58 N.E. 2d 381, 157 A.L.R. 1164 (1944).90 Harris v. Harris, 147 Ohio St. 437, 72 N.E. 2d 378 (1947).
[Vol. 46,
attempts to evade these restrictive statutes. And although Kentucky
has not as yet seen fit to adopt it-despite at least two good chances91
-it should not be discounted as a possible means for accomplishing
this purpose. It is quite conceivable that a fraud or intent test such
as we have now, will not be adequate in a comprehansive piece of
legislation.
The "Fraudulent Transfer" Exception-Kentucky
As we have already noted, the Kentucky treatment of the inter
vivos conveyance as a means of evading the statute is based on what
has been described as a "fraud" or "intent" test. This test, although it
represents a minority view insofar as it constitutes an exception to the
basic rule (absolute freedom of inter vivos transfer unless prevented
by statute) ,92 has become firmly fixed in several jurisdictions as a
means of thwarting inter vivos destruction of the spouse's statutory
share.93 It should not be confused with the Pennsylvania doctrine,
which required actual fraud before the spouse has an action. Instead,
the proposition here is that a conveyance made with intent to divest the
wife of her statutory share in the property conveyed is a fraud on her
marital rights. The problem involved, of course, is that of showing
intent. Frequently, this is an impossible task. As an aid, the Kentucky
Court has indulged in certain presumptions, which give the Kentucky
courts considerable discretion in the disposition of this sort of prob-
lem.94
An excellent summary of the Kentucky position was made by Chief
Justice Pryor, in 1886, in the case of Fennessey v. Fennessey.9 5 The
case involved an antenuptial gift by the husband-to-be to his children
by a former marriage. The facts were strongly against the second
wife, but she sought to claim her statutory share in the property
transferred, nevertheless. Judge Pryor, in upholding the conveyances,
clearly identified Kentucky with the fraud or intent test when he
said:90
91 Cochran's Adm'x. v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W. 2d 376 (1938); Martin
v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W. 2d 509 (1940).9242 Ky. L.J. 616, 628 (1953); 85 U. Pa. L.R. 139, 151 (1936).
93For instance, Missouri, Wanstrath v. Kappel, 356 Mo. 210, 201 S.W. 2d
327 (1947); New Hampshire, They v. Ibey, 93 N.H. 434, 43 A. 2d 157 (1945).
94See the bouquet tossed our way in 85 U. Pa. L.R. 139, 151, in fn. 42,
where several of the more important Kentucky cases are cited. On the other hand,
at least one writer disagrees rather vigorously with this opinion of the Kentucky
rules, at least so far as they are based on intent. For a thorough discussion of the
merits of the illusory test and a summary dismissal of any test based on intent,
see, Inter Vivos Trusts and Election, 42 Ky. L.J. 616.
95 84 Ky. 519, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 477, 2 S.W. 158 (1886).98 Id. at 479, 2 S.W. at 158.
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[Tihe reported cases canceling such conveyances make the fraudu-
lent intent with which they are made the question to be determined
by the jury or the court, and the parties holding under the deed may
show that no fraud was intended or practiced on the party com-
plaining. (Emphasis added)
He then went on to state what might be called the "Kentucky Pre-
sumption:" 97
In this State the substance of the decisions are, that for
the husband before marriage to convey the whole or the greater
portion of his estate away without the knowledge of the wife is a
fraud on her rights ...where any such voluntary conveyances are
made without the knowledge of one of the contracting parties [hus-
band or wife] it presents a prima facie case of fraud, subject to be
explained by the parties interested, and the burden is on the grantees
to establish the validity of the deed. (Emphasis added)
The court ultimately held that the conveyances in question were not
made with intent to defraud the wife, and explained that:98
Where the intention is to provide for the children, and
not to defraud the wife, and the advancement or gift is reasonable,
when considered with reference to the property owned by the donor
or grantor, the chancellor will uphold the transaction ... (Emphasis
added)
This apparently is an attempt to equate the rights of the two parties
who are most naturally the objects of the deceased spouse's bounty,
his wife and his children.
What Judge Pryor said substantially summarizes the present Ken-
tucky law. Basically, intent to defraud the wife's statutory rights must
be shown.9 9 It may be shown in any case where there is an attempt
to avoid operation of the statute, either by an antenuptial conveyance
of realty' 00 or personalty, 101 or by a transfer during coverture of per-
sonalty.10 2 The requisite intent may be shown from the evidence' 0 3
or presumed from testimony showing that (1) the surviving spouse
had no knowledge of the conveyance'0 4 and (2) that the property so
97 Id. at 482, 2 S.W. at 160.
98 Id. at 483, 2 S.W. at 160.
99 See also, Martin v. Martin, 282 Ky. 411, 138 S.W. 2d 509 (1940).
100 Leach v. Duvall, 71 Ky. 201 (8 Bush 1871); Goff v. Golfs Exr., 175 Ky.
75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917).
101 Patterson v. Pattersons Exr., 15 Ky. L. Rep. 755, 24 S.W. 880 (1894);
Wilson v. Wilson, 23 Ky. L. Rep. 1229, 64 S.W. 981 (1901).
'
02 Manikee's Adm'r. v. Beard, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 737, 2 S.W. 545 (1887);
Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 83 S.W. 2d 2 (1930).
103 Manikees Adm'r. v. Beard, 8 Ky. L. Rep. 737, 2 S.W. 545 (1887); Red-
mond's Adm'r. v. Redmond, 112 Ky. 760, 66 S.W. 745 (1902).
104 Murray v. Murray, 90 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890) (where an antenuptial
conveyance known to the wife was upheld but postnuptial transfers of which she
knew nothing were deemed fraudulent as to her); Smith v. Erwin, 26 Ky. L. Rep.
760, 82 S.W. 411 (1904) (where knowledge of the transfer by the wife defeated
[Vol. 46,
conveyed constituted the bulk of the decedents estate. 0 5 The latter
requirement has been modified by the rule, also set out by Judge
Pryor, that it is not a fraud upon the wife to make reasonable provision
for one's children. 106 As a result, it would probably be more accurate
to say that the presumption will arise when there is an unreasonable
gift or advancement-rather than a gift of all or the bulk-made with-
out the wife's knowledge. Reasonableness here is determined by look-
ing at (1) the value of the gift in relation to the value of the decedent's
estate and (2) the relationship or dependency of the donee to the
decedent and, as will be shown, (3) other facts and circumstances.
Applying these rules the Court in the past has found no difficulty
in striking down, as unreasonable and as a fraud on the marital rights
of the surviving spouse, gifts which constituted the entire estate of the
decedent,10 7 or the bulk or greater part of it, s08 whether the gifts were
made to children of the decedent or to others. It has been equally
consistent in upholding gifts where they consisted of a minor portion
of the whole estate'0 9 or where the wife had knowledge of the trans-
fer.10 Those cases falling in between these extremes present more
difficult problems, but they come closer to helping determine what is
reasonable and what is not. In each of them the decision seems to
turn on one or another of the factors mentioned. In Murray v. Mur-
ray,"' for example, the total estate concerned was $46,000; of this
$34,000, or approximately seventy-four per cent, had been conveyed
to the decedents sons by means of inter vivos gifts. The remainder
was bequeathed by a will which failed to name the wife and which
we are left to assume was renounced. These facts, said the Court,
established a prima facie case of fraud which was not rebutted by the
evidence. As a result, the value of the property conveyed was included
her claim); Goff v. Goffs Ex'rs., 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917) (where evi-
dence was held to sustain widow's contention that she did not know of the con-
veyance in question, allowing her to set aside deed to husband's sons).
105 Gibson v. Gibson, 12 Ky. L. Rep. 636 (1890); Wilson v. Wilson, 23
Ky. L. Rep. 1229, 65 S.W. 981 (1901); Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W. 2d
2 (1930); Cochran's Adm'x. v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W. 2d 376 (1938).
106 Patterson v. Patterson, supra note 101; Goff v. Goff's Ex'rs., 175 Ky. 75,
193 S.W. 1009 (1917).
107 Leach v. Duvall, 71 Ky. 201 (8 Bush 1871); Gibson v. Gibson, 12 Ky. L.
Rep. 636 (1890); Cochran's Adxnx. v. Cochran, 273 Ky. 1, 115 S.W. 2d 876
(1938).
108 Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 101; Rudd v. Rudd, 184 Ky. 400, 214 S.W.
791 (1919); Payne v. Tatem, 236 Ky. 306, 33 S.W. 2d 2 (1930); supra note 99.
109 Patterson v. Patterson, supra note 101, involving a gift of 20,000 out of
a total estate of $100,000.11o Murray v. Murray, supra note 104 at 4, 13 S.W. at 246. Smith v. Erwin,
26 Ky. L. Rep. 760, 82 S.W. 411 (1904).
11190 Ky. 1, 13 S.W. 244 (1890).
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in the total estate, and, after allowing a reasonable advancement for
the sons, the widow was awarded $10,000. Thus we see that a gift of
seventy-four per cent of the decedents total estate, even though made
to his children, is unreasonable and will raise a presumption of fraud-
especially where the wife is cut off by the will. No further figures
are given, but we can deduce from this that a reasonable provision,
depending upon whether the widow's provision is satisfied wholly from
the gifts or ratably from the gifts and legacies, would be somewhere
between $24,000 (fifty-two per cent) and $27,000 (sixty per cent).
This would indicate that under the Kentucky rules, a quite substantial
gift to children may be considered reasonable as to the surviving wife.
It also points up the discretionary power that is exercised by the
Court in such cases, a sort of dispensing authority to determine who
is entitled and to what extent they are entitled.
A similar exercise of discretion is demonstrated by Goff v. Gofs
Er.,"12 where shortly before his marriage to the plaintiff, the decedent,
without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, conveyed realty to
his two sons and his daughter, all children by a former wife. In up-
holding the conveyance to the daughter but not those to the sons, the
Court looked to several factors. Strong in favor of validity in the
court's eyes were the facts that (1) the donees were children of the
decedent for whom he had a right to make reasonable provision; (2)
the wealth of the decedent was bottomed on an original seven or
eight hundred dollars furnished by his former wife and due in large
part to her "economy", "thrift," and "untiring energy;" and (8) the
decedent had repeatedly promised his former wife that he would
make provisions for the daughter. In favor of the widow's contentions,
said the court, was the fact that the decedent had previously provided
for the sons by a substantial conveyance of realty. It was this latter
factor which led the court to the conclusion that the gift to the
daughter was a reasonable provision for her while those to the sons
were unreasonable and a fraud on the widow's rights. This is the
same sort of over-all appraisal found in the Murray case. Based on
the consideration of the relationship of the parties, the size of the gifts,
the source of the husband's wealth, and the existence or non-existence
of previous gifts to the children, the court decided just what each of
the litigants deserved to receive from the deceased's estate. In effect,
the court, in its determination of what was reasonable, drew a will
for the deceased spouse and father.
This concept reached a peak in 1949 in the case of Benge v. Bar-
112 175 Ky. 75, 193 S.W. 1009 (1917).
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nett."13 There the court decided that a gift to brothers and sisters,
unknown to the wife, of 45% of the personal property of the decedent
was unreasonable and, hence, a fraud on the widow's rights. The court
made it clear that "bulk" of the estate, as used in the Kentucky cases,
meant anything over one-half of the total estate. But even this water-
ing-down of the general test failed to fully sustain their holding, since
they had presumed fraud from a gift of only 45% of the personal
estate. To explain this, they stated: 114
In this case, since the gifts by the deceased to the
brother and sisters amounted to about 45% of the personalty owned
at the time of making them without the knowledge or consent of his
surviving widow, we must look to other facts and circumstances dis-
closed by the record in order to determine whether or not they raised
a presumption of fraudulent intent. ....
The facts to which they looked were two, (1) that the gift made,
though not the bulk of the decedents personal estate, was a sub-
stantial portion thereof, and (2) that by decedents will the widow
was given exactly what she would have taken as her statutory share
of the remaining estate. This, they said, was tantamount to saying,
"I do not want my wife to receive any portion of the personal property
that I own at my death." What should have been said was that in any
case where the answer is doubtful, the court will determine whether,
upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, the widow
is deserving and to what extent she is deserving.
Undoubtedly, reading this philosophy into the court's treatment
of a few close cases could warrant the criticism that we are making
mountains out of molehills. A close scrutiny, however, of just the bare
rules, as set out in the Fennessey case, will show that this sort of dis-
cretion is at least available to the court. On the one hand, they are
allowed to presume fraud where one spouse has given away the "bulk"
of his or her estate. On the other, they are allowed to determine what
constitutes the "bulk" in view of a rule that the spouse may make
reasonable provision for his children. And the cases demonstrate
that the test of reasonableness as a limitation on "bulk" is available
beyond those cases involving children-donees alone; Benge v. Barnett
clearly demonstrates this. Not only that, but the court has continually
broadened its scope with regard to the factors that it may consider
in determining whether to presume fraud or not. Bearing on the
question, it has said, are such factors as failure to provide for the
spouse by will,"l5 source of original capital,"16 role of earlier spouse in
"13 309 Ky. 354, 217 S.W. 2d 782 (1949).
114 Benge v. Barnett, supra note 113 at 358.
115 Murray v. Murray, supra note 104; Benge v. Barnett, supra note 113.
116 Goff v. Goffs Exr., supra note 100.
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assisting to amass the wealth, n17 dependency or non-dependency of
the donee,118 existence or non-existence of earlier gifts,119 representa-
tions of security by the donor to his wife-to-be, 120 regard of donor for
donee,'121 and generally suspicious circumstances. 122  Surely, if the
court may in its discretion look to such a variety of factors as these,
not to determine actual fraud, but merely to presume fraud, it has for
all practical purposes a very effective tool with which to impose its
notions of an equitable distribution of the deceased spouse's estate.
And if such a climate as this exists in the present Kentucky law, is it
not time to give the courts jurisdiction to compel fair distribution of
estates? This jurisdiction coupled with a statutory provision by which
the testator, through a reasonable will, could deprive the courts of
their jurisdiction, could solve many of the problems and answer many
of the complaints to which our present system is subject. To develop
this sort of plan, however, requires considerable cleaning up.
IV The Proposed Remedy
The problems presented by Kentucky's present patchwork pro-
visions for dependents of a testator should be apparent. The home-
stead provisions, for example, are in most cases worthless; and al-
though this objection might be removed by raising the maximum
allowable value, the problems of the testator in developing his testa-
mentary plan would thereby be multiplied. On the other hand, to
erase the homestead statute from the books completely would eliminate
one of only two statutory provisions for non-pretermitted children of
the testator.123 And so we have an impasse; but it is by no means the
only inadequacy in our system. The provisions for children generally
make no sense. Children of whom the testator has either lost track
completely or who were born after the will's execution come in for
their full intestate share, while children in existence when the will was
made are cut out completely unless the will provides for them.124
Admittedly the presumption that the testator would want to provide
117 Fennessey v. Fennessey, supra note 95; Goff v. Goff's ex'r., supra note
200.
118 Anderson v. Anderson, 194 Ky. 763, 240 S.W. 1061 (1922); Payne v.
Tatem, supra note 102; Benge v. Barnett, supra note 113.
119 Goff v. Goff's Ex'r., supra note 100.
120 Wilson v. Wilson, supra note 100.
121 Payne v. Tatem, supra note 102.
122 Anderson v. Anderson, supra note 118.
123 The other is the widow's exemption which goes to either the widow or the
infant children. KRS 391.030.
12 4 For authority to the effect that frequently a pretermitted child will take
a larger share by intestacy than even a child named in the will, see Mathews,
Tretermitted Heirs: An Analysis of the Statutes, 29 Col. L.R. 748, 768.
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for afterborn or lost children has its roots in reason. But reduced to a
statutory rule it soon loses its rationality. For instance, it would be
hard to rationalize the case where the testator leaves everything to
his wife on the assumption that she will adequately provide for the
family, only to have a prodigal son or afterborn child come in and
demand his intestate share. The result in such a case is not only in-
equitable but indicative of the damage that can be wrought on an
otherwise carefully planned testamentary scheme by a statute that
gives an absolute right as opposed to judicial discretion.
Many of these complaints cannot be honestly directed at the
statutes providing for the surviving spouse. Not only are these sections
generous but the survivor's interest is mathematically calculable, mak-
ing it possible for the testator to minimize the chances of an election
against the will by making a will provision for the spouse that will
match the elective share under the statute. In addition, the rights are
real and well protected. As soon as any piece of real property is
acquired by one spouse, an inchoate interest-equivalent to a one-third
life estate-arises in the other. And it remains, even though the prop-
erty is conveyed away, unless both of them join in the deed. The per-
sonal property exemption is likewise a valuable right; $1500 is set
apart immediately following the death of the husband and is thus
never even included in the estate. And finally, the statutory share in
real and personal property, although a mere expectancy until one
spouse's death, is protected from inter vivos nullification by the judge-
made rules discussed in the last section. However, the picture does
have its darker side. The same provision is made in all cases, whether
the widow involved is a faithful wife and loving mother of forty years
standing or a young fortune-hunter who has contributed nothing and
expects everything. Perhaps it is too much to expect the legislature
to protect a man from his follies, but would it be too much to ask
them to help? Would it be unreasonable, for instance, to have them
lower the absolute amount of the elective share and permit the court,
on application of the surviving spouse, to determine what a reasonable
provision for him or her would be? As pointed out earlier, a result
similar to this is already being reached in Kentucky in cases involving
inter vivos conveyances used to avoid the statutes. It could be, how-
ever, that this solution as to the surviving spouse would be inequitable
or unworkable as to children or other heirs. The matter requires a
broader look.
Taking this broad look, certain conclusions seem undeniable.
First-and foremost-it should be obvious that any legislation in this
area is or will be a compromise between two conflicting interests.
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On one hand a testator has an interest in being able to dispose by will
of his accumulated wealth. On the other hand, his dependents have
an interest in being reasonably provided for after his death. In Ken-
tucky today the statutes attempt to reconcile these conflicting interests
by rule, with a different point of balance established for each of several
classes of people. This creates a confused situation in which neither
interest receives full consideration in every case. It is this very situa-
tion which makes apparent my second point, that Kentucky has
developed no general policy which requires consideration in any pro-
posed legislation. The legislature has, however, made clear a specific
policy in the case of a surviving spouse, a policy that husband and
wife be treated alike and that this treatment be generous. This attitude
was emphasized by the action of the 1956 assembly. A third point is
demonstrated by the cases of fraud on marital rights; they make it
clear that in a given case the Kentucky Court, considering all the facts
and circumstances, is willing to make its own determination of what
constitutes a reasonable disposition of a testator's property. With these
conclusions in mind, the author makes the following recommendations:
(1) Institution of any comprehensive system of legislation requires
repeal of all present statutes restricting testation. In the case of the
homestead statute this would include only that section which pre-
serves the right to the widow and/or infant children; its operation to
prevent the sale of the homestead property by creditors during the life
of the owner would be unaffected. All of the other sections, the
pretermitted and unknown child statutes, the quarantine provision, the
widow's exemption, and the section permitting the surviving spouse to
elect a statutory share in lieu of the will would be eliminated com-
pletely. This would, however, have no effect on intestate succession
or on the surviving spouse's intestate rights.
(2) Once the board is clean, legislation meeting two basic require-
ments should be enacted. One requirement is certainty. So long as a
testator is to be restricted in the disposition of his property he deserves
to know-and this will be of especial concern where a very large estate
is involved-that by meeting his legal obligations he can prevent dis-
ruption of his testamentary scheme. The other requirement is flexi-
bility. Any legislation in this area should, unlike our present statutes,
enable the courts to take into account the multitudinous factors which
bear on an individual case. It must avoid the inequities inherent in
any system which makes the same provision in all cases, a system
which allows the widow proportionately the same interest in a thou-
sand dollar estate as is awarded a widow whose husband leaves a
million.
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Concededly, these characteristics make contrary demands. The
writer firmly believes, however, that these demands can be reconciled
in a system of legislation having the following characteristics:
(a) Fundamentally, it must be discretionary. An excellent pro-
totype would be the English Inheritance Act. 25 This legislation, en-
acted in 1938 and based on the New Zealand Family Protection Act
of 1908,120 gives certain dependents12 of the testator the right to come
into court and contest the ,wil if that dependent is "of the opinion that
the will does not make reasonable provision" for his or her mainte-
nance. The court then hears the evidence and, subject to certain
limitation,128 makes such provision for the applicant's maintenance as
it deems "reasonable." Certain factors are set out as guides for the
court in determining what is a reasonable provision, but these could
hardly be considered serious limitations on the court's discretion, since
the Act further allows a court to look to "any other matter or thing
which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant
or material to that dependent, to the beneficiaries under the will or
otherwise."129 Nevertheless, at least one writer has felt that more
equitable results have been reached under the New Zealand Act
where no limitations at all are placed on the court's discretion, either
as to amount or factors involved.130 His argument is persuasive-at
least as a suggestion to prospective legislators, since the temptation to
limit the courts in their discretion can, once yielded to, become a
runaway and eventually destroy the whole character of the legislation.
Whichever of these views is taken, however, the fact remains that the
power given the court by the legislation must be primarily discre-
tionary.
This discretionary character, by itself, meets our requirement for
flexibility. The court can look to all of the facts and circumstances
that it has been accustomed to consider in the marital fraud cases,
thus actually deciding each case on its merits. Desirable as this is,
however, it is certainly going to meet with one objection. And that
is that the courts will be flooded with litigation. The argument seems
125 Supra note 7.
12 i8Edw VU (1908).
127 The term dependents (spelled dependants there) is used in the Act as a
generic term covering the spouse and chden of the decedent alone.
128 They are limited in the case of a surviving spouse with dependents to an
allowance of two-thirds of the net annual income from the estate, and in the case
of a surviving spouse alone or children alone to one-half of the net annual income.
However, in the case of an estate worth less than two thousand pounds, the court
may give not only all income but may invade the principal.
129 Supra note 125 at 403.
130 53 Harv. L.R. 465, 469 (1940).
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tenable, but as a matter of fact, under neither the British nor New
Zealand legislation has this been the result. Under the New Zealand
Act, after thirty years of operation, only seventy-seven of a total of
4,396 wills had been contested-a mere 1.750./ 131 The experience in
Great Britain has been substantially the same; after five years only
eleven cases had been reported.132 At least one English reviewer at-
tributes much of this success to family solidarity, and substantiates his
position by a review of the cases, almost all of which arose from un-
happy or abnormal unions. In view of the prevalence of divorce,
separation, and second marriages in this country it might be arguable
that our success could not be so complete. It seems doubtful, however,
that the American family has disintegrated to the point where this sort
of legislation would be absolutely unworkable.
(b) A second requirement is that the courts be given a workable
standard. In New Zealand, where none was set out in the legislation,
the courts have spent a half century developing one; they have come
to the position that they should look at a case from the viewpoint of a
just and reasonable, but not a loving, testator under the circum-
stancesJ 33 It would seem foolish not to profit by this experience by
adopting a similar standard.
(c) The statute should not create an absolute right in any of the
decedents property. It has already been noted that the English Act
only authorizes the court to give a decree for maintenance and sup-
port. I see no reason for a Kentucky statute to differ. Although
heretofore our only experience has been with statutes creating abso-
lute rights-for example the homestead right or the widow's exemption
-the underlying purpose of those statutes has been to provide for
support and maintenance. As pointed out previously, however, it has
been impossible for them to accomplish this because of their inability
to adjust to individual cases. For instance, the widow whose husband
wills away all of his $4,000 can claim only a statutory one-third life
estate; in reality, she needs and should probably have the whole
amount, although in view of her generally limited business experience,
it is probably best that it not be given her in a lump sum. The pro-
posed statute, which can take into account such factors as the standard
of living to which the spouse has been accustomed, the length of her
marriage (disposing of the fortune hunter), and her actual needs,
can remedy these inequities.
131 1 Mod. L.R. 296, 304.
132 6 Mod. L.R. 215, 226.
13 3 Supra note 30 at 468.
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(d) Relief should be available to surviving spouses and children
of the testator. Persons outside of this group have no legal claim for
support during the life of the decedent and there appears to be no
reason for changing this at his or her death. If they are being sup-
ported by the testator it must be voluntary and, therefore, will prob-
ably be continued by terms of the will. In addition, the present Ken-
tucky statutes, as well as the statutes of most other states, go no
further than the immediate family.
The English Act limits the right of action in the case of surviving
spouses to widows and widowers; remarriage terminates not only this
right but any support payments being made under the Act. This seems
eminently sound and should be incorporated in any Kentucky legisla-
tion. So should the English provision which keeps a physically or
mentally incapable child eligible during his incapacity. Not so, how-
ever, other sections concerning the children. These state that no son
over twenty-one who is physically and mentally capable of maintaining
himself is eligible under the Act. The same is true of a married
daughter who is physically and mentally capable of maintaining her-
self. This has several failings. In the first place, it results in a prefer-
ence for the unmarried daughter which is unwarranted under modern
conditions. In view of the availability of temporary or career employ-
ment for women it would seem that most daughters today should be
as well able to support themselves as sons. On the other hand, how-
ever, both son and daughter should be eligible for support until they
have completed their education, even beyond majority. This sort of
thing would have to be limited in order to prevent scholastic "bums",
but it is a real necessity.
In an attempt to incorporate the desirable features of the English
law and to correct its failings, the author suggests the following:
(1) That a child of either sex be eligible for support so long as he
or she is physically or mentally incapable of supporting him-
self or herself.
(2) That a physically capable daughter be eligible for support
until such time as she marries or, if she does not marry, until
such time as she reaches twenty-one or completes her educa-
tion, whichever last occurs.
(3) That a physically capable son should be eligible under the
Act until such time as he reaches twenty-one or completes his
education, whichever last occurs.
(4) That a surviving spouse be eligible under the Act until re-
marriage.
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It should be kept in mind with regard to each of these that eligibility
in no sense means right to support; it means only right to bring an
action contesting the will.
(e) The statute should make it possible for a testator to avoid the
jurisdiction of the courts by making a specified provision for spouse
and/or children. Undoubtedly, this should not be allowed in cases of
small estates, since the entire estate might well be required to provide
the necessary support. This principle has been recognized in New
York where a statute precludes the surviving spouse, in the case of a
large estate, from electing against the will if the testator sets up a
testamentary trust providing income for life from property amounting
to no less than one-third of his estate.134 This is a good model but
without modification would be too arbitrary for our purposes. A fairer
system would be to provide a sliding scale, requiring the poor testator
to make greater provision, percentage-wise, than the rich. Although
at first blush this seems anything but fair, when it is remembered that
our objective is to provide reasonable maintenance and support, it
should be clear that a smaller portion of a $500,000 estate is necessary
to support a wife and/or children than is necessary in the case of a
$10,000 estate, even taking into consideration the different standards
of living. Of course, any such scale would have to be the product of
extensive investigation; an arbitrary set of standards or one which
could be rendered obsolete by economic swings could make a mockery
of the entire statute.
(f) Broad discretion should be given the courts to strike down any
inter vivos conveyance made in an attempt to evade the statute. The
present state of the Kentucky law, as analyzed earlier-and especially
in view of the broad language used in Benge v. Barnett' 3 -- would un-
doubtedly suffice in this regard. To give general legislative sanction
to this practice, section thirty-three of the Model Probate Code might
profitably be used as a model. It provides:
(a) Election to treat as a devise. Any gift made by a person,
whether dying testate or intestate, in fraud of the marital rights of
his surviving spouse to share in his estate, shall, at the election of
the surviving spouse, be treated as a testamentary disposition and
may be recovered from the donee and persons taking from him
without adequate consideration and applied to the payment of the
spouse's share, as in case of his election to take against the will.
(b) When gift deemed fraudulent. Any gift made by a married per-
son within two years of the time of his death is deemed to be in
fraud of the marital rights of his surviving spouse, unless shown to
the contrary.136
134 N.Y. Dec. Est. Law, Sec. 18.
135 Supra note 113.136 Simes, Problems in Probate Law, 72-73 (1946).
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This section, though framed to complement the statutory share type
of legislation found in the Model Code, has desirable basic character-
istics which would fit into our plan. It uses the broad phrase "in fraud
of the marital rights", which should indicate an intent to incorporate
much of our present law. At the same time it puts the burden to dis-
prove fraud on any donee of a gift made within two years of death.
This latter provision goes the one extra step necessary to "put teeth"
into the statute and should discourage attempts at evasion.
V Conclusion
The author feels that the foregoing suggestions, though undoubt-
edly subject to modification and refinement, form the nucleus of a
workable and intelligent plan, which would, as much as possible,
reconcile the conflicting interests that are brought to bear on any
legislation of this nature. These proposals recognize the need for con-
sideration of each case in light of all the attendant circumstances,
avoiding, almost completely, arbitrary rules. At the same time, the
prospective testator can intelligently predict whether or not his testa-
mentary scheme will be disturbed-can even make a provision that will
eliminate the possibility entirely. Finally, if his will is upset, the
extent of damage done will assuredly be in direct proportion to the
unreasonableness with which he acted in making his will.
1. Leland Brewster
